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Abstract
This paper examines the e¤ects of two di¤erent education -
nancing systems: a foundation system and a state system on
the level and distribution of resources devoted to education in
the presence of private schools. We use political economy ap-
proach where households di¤er in their level of income, and the
central tax rate used to nance education is determined by a ma-
jority vote. Our analysis focuses on implications of allowing for
a private-school option. To evaluate the importance of private
schools we develop a computational model and calibrate it using
USA data. The results reveal that the private school option is
very important quantitatively in terms of welfare, total resources
spent on education and equity.
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1 Introduction
Many authors examine how di¤erent education nance systems a¤ect
the level of spending on education, its distribution and associated to-
tal welfare1. However, their research is concentrated mainly on public
schools, with little attention paid to the existence of private schools. As
I am deeply indebted to Carmen Beviá, Moshe Justman, Jordi Caballé, Matthias
Dahm, Bernardo Moreno and Enriqueta Aragones for their valuable comments and
suggestions. I also want to thank Generalitat de Catalunya for nancial support.
yCorrespondence: Economic Studies, University of Dundee, 3 Perth Road, Dundee
DD1 4HN, UK; Tel: (+44) (0) 1382 384372; Fax: (+44) (0) 1382 384691; Email:
a.kwiatkowski@dundee.ac.uk.
1Among many we mention works of Fernández and Rogerson (1997, 1998, 1999,
2003), Bearse, Glomm and Ravikumar (2001).
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a result, there is relatively little analysis addressing how di¤erent educa-
tion system outcomes are a¤ected by the presence of a private education
sector. The aim of this paper is to ll this gap in the case of selected
education systems.
Central to the understanding how a school nance system a¤ects the
sum of education resources and the welfare is an analysis of the mech-
anisms through which it transfers resources across individuals. The ob-
jective of this paper is to study these mechanisms in a simple general
equilibrium model and to perform a calibration exercise to asses their
quantitative signicance. In order to do so, we use a standard model
of local public nance and extend it by allowing for the existence of
a private alternative. In our model we have a large number of house-
holds that are heterogeneous with regard to income and perfectly sorted
into homogenous communities (districts). The education nance system
sets down the rules that govern how revenues are raised and distributed
across communities for education spending. The key parameters of the
education nance system are determined by a majority vote.
The framework we employ could be used to study diverse changes
in education nance systems. Our analysis is motivated by the expe-
rience of California, since this case received considerable attention in
the literature. Legislative regulations introduced in the 1970s changed
Californias education nance from a foundation system in which local
expenditures supplement expenditure levels guaranteed by the state, to
one in which e¤ectively all nancing is done at the state level. Sub-
sequent to these changes, Californias share of personal income going
to public education fell by 10% and the enrolment in private schools
increased by 3%.
The literature that studies transition from a foundation system to a
state system abstracts from the existence of private schools and changes
in their enrolment. Since in general private schools are attended by chil-
dren of the wealthiest families, who spend on education more than poorer
families, the impact of private schools on levels of total education spend-
ing and of total welfare may be quantitatively very substantial. In this
paper, by allowing for the existence of private schools, we are trying to
asses the importance of a private-school sector in an educational system.
We do this by comparing our results with those obtained by other au-
thors, who did not consider private schools in their models. We study
the impact of private schools on changes in total education spending and
welfare when we go from a foundation system to a state system of the
education nance.
In our paper we show that compared to pure systems without pri-
vate schools the private alternative introduces substantial distortion in
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welfare and education spending distributions. In particular we argue
that introducing the private-school alternative reverses the present-in-
the-literature ranking in which a foundation system is welfare superior
to a state system (for instance in the work of Fernández and Rogerson
(2003)). In the light of our ndings this ranking turns out to be true
only if we do not allow in the model for the existence of private schools.
We also show that the private-school alternative inuences the equity
under both nance systems, especially strongly in the case of a state
system. A pure state system, which is considered to be the most eq-
uitable among di¤erent education nance systems, after introducing a
private-school option represents an equity level only a little higher than
a foundation system. Moreover, this new equity level is far from the
perfect equity level attributed to the pure state system. Our ndings
conrm the present-in-the-literature result (for instance in the work of
Fernández and Rogerson (1999)) that a shift from a foundation to a state
system causes a fall in total resources spent on public education. They
also reveal that this change of a nance system may result in decreasing
per-student spending in both public and private sector. This happens,
though private schools benet from higher total spending under a state
system than under a foundation one.
Our work is closely related to several papers. It builds directly on
the work of Fernández and Rogerson (1999), who study transition from
a foundation system to a state system in a static model. A key di¤erence
between their work and ours is that they do not allow in their model for
the existence of private schools. Our comparisons of the nance systems
follow the work of Fernández and Rogerson (2003), who compare sev-
eral education nance systems, including a foundation one and a state
one, in terms of total expenditure and welfare. They also do not con-
sider private schools in their model, which is similar to Fernández and
Rogerson (1997, 1998), who study the change of a pure local education
nance system into a pure state system in a dynamic context. Bearse,
Glomm and Ravikumar (2001) allowing for the private-school alterna-
tive, examine change from a decentralized to a centralized nance system
in two-school-district economy in both static and dynamic contexts. A
large volume of the literature focuses on private schools as an alternative
way of obtaining education. Epple and Romano (1996a) and Glomm and
Ravikumar (1998) study properties of a voting equilibrium under mixed
regime of public and private education. Epple and Romano (1998) and
Epple, Figlio and Romano (2004) using complicated setting with peer
e¤ects study competition between private and public schools. Martínez
Mora (2003) and Nechyba (1999) study householdschoices between pub-
lic and private education in models with mobility among communities
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and housing issues. Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003) try to link a theo-
retical model of mixed private-public education with empirical evidence.
Our work is also related to papers that focus on a foundation system.
For instance Epple and Romano (1996b) study properties of a voting
equilibrium under the system, in which a publicly provided good can be
supplemented further with private purchase, like in a foundation system.
An outline of the paper follows. In Section 2 we provide an ana-
lytical characterization of a foundation system and of a state system
of public education nance when the presence of private schools is al-
lowed. Section 3 presents our calibration exercise and provides results
of quantitative comparison of both education nance systems. Section
4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Analysis of a Foundation and a State
System with Private Schools
2.1 The Model
The impact of a particular education-nance system on welfare and a
level of total education expenditure depends generally upon many ele-
ments. The most important cover the details of the nancing system
itself, their interaction with the state and local tax systems, the dis-
tribution of income, the way in which tax rates, spending, and other
key variables are chosen, the distribution of employment and housing
locations, etc. In our model we choose to abstract away from many
of these important factors in order to concentrate mainly on two vari-
ables: the distribution of income and the endogenous determination of
the parameters of the nancing system.
In our model the economy consists of a continuum of households,
with their population normalized to one. Each household consists of a
parent and a child. Households have identical preferences over a pri-
vate consumption good c (the numeraire) and over the childs education
quality q. These preferences are described by the utility function, whose
general formula is given by U(c; q) = u(c) + v(q), where U : R2+ ! R
is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. We also
assume that Inada conditions hold and that both c and q are normal
goods. Throughout the paper we will in particular refer to a specic
class of the utility functions that satisfy these conditions: the class of
the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility functions of the form
U(c; q) =
(
c1 
1

1  1
+  q
1  1
1  1
;  6= 1
ln (c)+ ln (q), = 1
, (1)
where  and  are strictly positive constants and  is the elasticity of
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substitution between consumption and schooling. These CES utility
functions are commonly used to model education demand.
By assumption households di¤er only in their endowments of income
y. Its distribution is described by the cumulative distribution function
F (y), where F : R! [0; 1]. The mean income m is assumed to be nite
and greater than the median income me, i.e F (m) > 0:5.
In order to focus on distribution across communities we will use the
assumption of perfect sorting, which will allow us to abstract from issues
of distribution within the community. This assumption is commonly
used in public nance literature. Hence, in our model we have equal-
sized districts, indexed by i, consisting of households with the same level
of income, which at the district level results in perfect agreement over
the preferred levels of consumption and education quality.
By assumption, children go to school in the district where they live.
In our model we have two types of schools: public and private ones. In
a state system, public schools are nanced only centrally from the state
budget. In a foundation system, public schools are nanced in a mixed
way: centrally from the state budget by means of so called grants, and
locally by means of additional taxation within districts. Private schools
are modelled as clubs formed by parents under an equal cost sharing rule,
which follows the Nechyba (1999) approach. These schools are nanced
by parents from their disposable income.
The quality of education that a child receives q is solely a function
of spending per student s. In di¤erent types of schools we allow for the
possibility that parents perceive a dollar spent on education in private
schools as more e¤ective than a dollar spent on public education, which
a¤ects schooling quality. We assume that the relationship between the
spending and the quality is expressed by q = a  s, where a is some posi-
tive constant (we will call it "the quality parameter"), which accounts for
what is perceived by parents as the di¤erences between di¤erent types
of schools. These di¤erences are reported by many authors. Cohen-
Zada and Justman (2003) argue that private schools provide schooling
more e¢ ciently than public schools and that many parents of private-
school children perceive it to be the case. In the United States, opting
out of public education does not reduce households school-tax liabil-
ity. Thus it makes sense only if parents believe that the private school
of their choice provides a better education than public schools. Av-
erage tuition levels in private schools are considerably lower than the
spending per student in public schools. It means that private tuition
dollars are perceived to be more e¤ective than tax dollars (at least by
those who opt for cheaper private education). However, a lower tuition
level doesnt necessarily mean that total private-school expenditures are
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lower. Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003) argue that a considerable part of
private schoolscosts is covered by subsidies and donations from di¤erent
sources like local households, dioceses, etc. As an example, they provide
a nding that about 50% of costs in Catholic elementary schools are
covered by donations from local households and dioceses, and implicitly
by teachers who are members of religious orders and accept less than the
going wages. Another possible source of the heterogeneity of private and
public schools, that also may be decisive in the choice of a school type,
lies in the fact that often public schools are secular, and private ones
religious. Some such private schools teach religious education, together
with the usual academic subjects to impress their particular faith, beliefs
and traditions in the students who attend. For instance, in the United
States among all elementary and secondary schools, Catholic schools ac-
count for half of all private enrolment, and other religious schools for
another third (Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003)), which means that the
vast majority of private education is non-secular. Hence, apart from the
factors mentioned earlier, choosing private education may be as a result
of preferences for religious education instead of a secular one. In terms
of our earlier discussion it just means that parents who have decided
to send their child to a private (religious) school perceive every tuition
dollar to be more productive than a dollar spent on public education be-
cause it provides them (their children) with the type of education that
they value much and which cannot be obtained in a public school. All
these arguments point out that the perceived advantage of private edu-
cation is the result of the combined e¤ect of a variety of possible factors:
greater operating e¢ ciency, subsidized tuition, an innate preference for
a religious school environment, and other factors. We introduce the -
nal combined e¤ect of all these factors on parentsperception of private
schooling by setting a = 1 for public schools and a > 1 for private ones
and hold it constant for a given type of school. Hence we assume the
same (perceived by parents) advantage level for a set of schools of the
same type. However, to focus our analysis and simplify the model we
abstract from any other factors that might a¤ect the quality such as
peer e¤ects (i.e., the possibility that who you go to school with mat-
ters)2, childs abilities or parental characteristics other than income. By
assumption they do not a¤ect schooling quality.
Also to simplify matters we will restrict our attention to proportional
taxes based on income both at the state and local levels. In reality
however, in some countries, e.g. the USA, state taxes are often based
on income, but local taxes are based on property value. Introducing
2The literature doesnt provide clear conclusion about the role of peer e¤ects in
education. More details in Nechyba (1999).
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this distinction to the model would require endogenizing the value of
housing, which would complicate matters considerably.
Throughout the paper, we will assume that households have an alter-
native option of obtaining schooling services from a competitive private-
school sector, where the state nancial support is not available, but still
having tax liability. The price of private schooling services is normalized
to unity.
2.2 Foundation System with Private Schools
In this model all districts are required to collect income taxes at a uni-
form rate  from all households in exchange for some guaranteed base
level of expenditures per student - the foundation grant g. However,
households in a district may only spend on education this grant or de-
cide to supplement it by further taxing their own income. Households
have also an alternative option of obtaining schooling services from a
competitive private-school sector, where the grant is not available, but
still having tax liability. Let f 2 [0; 1] denote the proportion of house-
holds choosing publicly provided services under this system.
2.2.1 Public schools under a foundation system
Lets assume for a while that households in a district utilize grants and
that f is xed. Given that the tax revenues are used to fund the foun-
dation grant and that the central budget is balanced, the grant level
is
g =
m
f
.
However, households in a district may spend on education only this grant
or supplement this grant by further taxing their own income. Letting ti
denote the district is tax level we have
ci=(1     ti)yi
si=
m
f
+ tiyi
.
The foundation tax rate  (and thus the foundation grant level) is
chosen by a majority vote (i.e.  must be preferred to any other tax rate
in a pair-wise comparison by at least 50% of the voters). To solve for
preferred tax rates in districts that use grants, we will assume that tax
rate decisions are made in two stages. In the rst one, a majority vote
at the state level determines the foundation tax, and in the second stage
districts make their district tax choice.
Lets start with the district tax decision. Given a state-wide founda-
tion tax rate outcome  , a districts preferred tax rate ti is the solution to
the representative household in district is maximisation problem (recall
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that for public schools q = s)3
max
ti
fu((1     ti)yi) + v( mf + tiyi)g
s:t ti  0
, (2)
yielding the rst order condition
  u0((1     ti)yi)yi + v0(m
f
+ tiyi)yi  0, (3)
with equality for ti > 0.
As the solution to the problem (2) we obtain a function ti() which
corresponds to the representative households optimal choice of ti given
 .
Next we nd the state-wide foundation tax rate by solving for a
preferred foundation tax rate as a function of individual income, i.e., we
solve
max

fu((1     ti())yi) + v( mf + ti()yi)g
s:t   0
and obtain the rst order condition
 u0(:)yi + v0(:)m
f
+ ( u0(:) + v0(:))yidti
d
 0,
which using (3) and the Envelope Theorem gives
  u0((1     ti)yi)yi + v0(m
f
+ tiyi)
m
f
 0, (4)
with equality for  > 0.
Suppose now that a preferred foundation tax rate  is positive, which
implies that u
0
((1  ti)yi)yi = v0( mf +tiyi)mf . Then (3) can be satised
only if yi  mf . It follows that all households in districts with income
above m
f
must prefer a zero foundation tax rate. And now suppose that
a preferred district tax rate ti is positive, which implies that u
0
((1  
   ti)yi)yi = v0( mf + tiyi)yi. Then (4) will be satised only if yi  mf .
It follows that all households in districts with income below m
f
must
prefer a zero district tax rate (conditional upon obtaining their preferred
foundation tax rate).
These results reveal that each district prefers to rely exclusively on
either central or local funding4. As state and local spending are perfect
3Assumed strict concavity of the utility function guarantees that both district and
state-wide preferred tax rates are unique. This also implies that rst order conditions
are necessary and su¢ cient for optimum.
4This statement is valid for all districts except for the district with income equal
to mf . This district is indi¤erent between the two types of funding. Since the measure
of households in this district is zero, this fact is of no practical consequence in terms
of our computational results in Section 3.
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substitutes, each district chooses the type of funding which is cheaper in
terms of the tax price5. For households in districts with income yi > mf
local funding is cheaper than state funding and hence they prefer a zero
foundation tax rate and would rather fund schooling from local taxes.
The opposite applies to households in districts with yi < mf . They prefer
the foundation grant to fund their entire demand for education.
In equilibrium households in some districts will supplement the grant
with their own additional funds. As we stated earlier the foundation tax
rate  (and thus the foundation grant level) is chosen by a majority
vote of all districts, which by the perfect income sorting assumption is
equivalent to a majority vote of all households. To determine in which
districts the grant will be supplemented we have to refer to the income
of the decisive district. As we will see later when the problem of a voting
equilibrium will be discussed in a detailed way, the income level in the
decisive district is never greater than the median income. Since the
income distribution is skewed, the median income is below the mean
income. Using this and previous results we see that the decisive voter
will always prefer a zero district tax rate and a positive foundation tax
rate. Let yd denote the income of the decisive voter and   its most
preferred foundation tax rate. Using the rst order condition (3) we
obtain that for the decisive voter
v
0
(
 m
f
) < u
0
((1   )yd).
Hence there exists the income level ey satisfying
v
0
(
 m
f
) = u
0
((1   )ey).
It follows from properties of the utility function that ey > yd. Then we
have that all households in districts with income lower than yd will set
ti = 0. By continuity, households in the decisive district and households
in some other districts with income yi  yd but smaller than ey will also
not supplement the grant with additional taxation since for all of them
still v
0
( 
m
f
) < u
0
((1   )yi). Finally all households in the districts with
income yi > ey will set a positive district tax rate ti.
For further reference the induced indirect utility function of a house-
hold in a district i that uses public services is
V ( ; ti; f; yi) = u((1     ti)yi) + v(m
f
+ tiyi).
5Tax price is dened as the amount of extra local tax revenue that a district must
generate in order to yield an extra unit of local spending on education. This is equal
to marginal rate of substitution between schooling and consumption v
0
(:)
u0 (:)
. For local
funding this is equal to one, and for state funding yifm .
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2.2.2 Private schools under a foundation system
Now we will concentrate on districts that utilize private schooling. In
our model, all households in all districts pay taxes but each one is free
to choose between publicly and privately provided school services. All
private-sector users have full freedom to adjust schooling expenditures
to their needs, whereas in a public sector this applies only to a part
of its users. In private schooling the education spending level is spe-
cic to households in a district and may vary across districts. It is not
completely the case for those districts which have chosen public-sector
services. In a public sector, households in poor districts have the same
level of education spending determined by the grant level. Only richer
districts are able to supplement this grant and hence obtain a higher
education spending level, specic to them.
Each household in a district that utilizes private-school services allo-
cates its after-tax (disposable) income to consumption expenditures and
private schooling services. Note that we do not allow for mixing public
and private services. No household can choose publicly provided services
(with supplementation or not) and top it up with some private services
or the other way round. The representative household in a district i that
uses private-school services faces the following budget constraint
(1  )yi = ci + si.
Taking a foundation tax rate  as given and assuming that technology
of converting school expenditures into quality is qi = a  si (a > 1) the
utility maximization problem becomes
max
ci;si
fu(ci) + v(a  si)g
s:t
8<:
ci + si  (1  )yi
ci  0
si  0
.
The solution to this problem is unique and interior, given the assump-
tions made about the utility function6. Let W ( ; yi) denote the in-
duced indirect utility function of the representative household in district
i that chooses private services. The improved quality of public education
doesnt a¤ect the utility of such a household, hence the indirect utility
W ( ; yi) varies inversely to changes in the tax rate  .
6Assumed strict concavity of the utility function guarantees uniqueness. Inada
conditions imply interior solution.
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2.2.3 Equilibrium under a foundation system with private
schools
Assume now that all districts in the economy anticipate the same pub-
lic enrolment rate f e. Once the foundation tax rate  has been de-
termined by majority voting (recall that  denotes the decisive voter
most preferred foundation tax rate) all households in districts compare
their V ( ; ti; f e; yi) and W ( ; yi) and decide which type of schooling
to choose. Households in a district i will choose to send their children
to a public school if V ( ; ti; f e; yi) > W ( ; yi).
Since each household in a district, while making this public-private
choice, takes as given the proportion of households (districts) choosing
publicly provided services f e, we have to be sure that in an equilib-
rium, the individual decisions are consistent with the aggregate out-
comes. That is the proportion of households for which V ( ; ti; f e; yi) >
W ( ; yi) must be exactly equal to f e.
Now given a foundation tax rate  we will compare utility of the rep-
resentative household in a given district when it uses public and private
education services. Notice that in both cases the representative house-
hold pays the tax at the rate  , hence its after-foundation-tax disposable
income is the same. The grant that the representative household receives
using public services increases its disposable income. If the quality pa-
rameter a is equal to one for both public and private services, which
means that there are no quality gains from switching from public to
private schools, the representative household can obtain a higher utility
level using the grant and a public school (without supplementation of
the grant for low-income districts and with supplementation for higher-
income ones) than funding its education entirely from its disposable
income and using a private school. It follows that if there is no quality
advantage of private schooling, then for any level of income the represen-
tative household is better o¤ using public rather than private services.
However, if the quality parameter a is still equal to one for public schools
but higher than one for private schools and also high enough, then gains
in perceived quality in private schools may compensate the e¤ect of the
grant on disposable income and - as a consequence - on the utility level
of the representative household and allow it to switch to a private school.
From now on we will assume that the value of the quality parameter a
guarantees that some districts will opt out of a public sector.
As opting out of public education does not reduce tax obligations of
the representative household in a given district, and this household is
aimed at obtaining a higher quality of education (and education quality
is a normal good), other things being equal, households in districts that
opt out of public schooling will be those with higher incomes. For a
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given foundation tax level  2 (0; 1), there exists a threshold income
level y = y( ; f e) such that all households in districts with income below
y send their children to public schools and all households in districts with
income above y send their children to private schools. This threshold
income is implicitly dened by V ( ; ti; f e; y) = W ( ; y).
Using the threshold income y the consistency condition for an equi-
librium given a foundation tax rate  can be written as f e = F (y( ; f e))
- the anticipated public-school enrolment rate must equal an actual en-
rolment rate.
All districts in the economy vote on tax rates and the equilibrium
foundation tax rate  is the one chosen by a majority of voters. House-
holds in districts can choose between publicly and privately funded ed-
ucation services. Consequently, after the foundation tax rate has been
set they consider the e¤ect of this tax on both indirect utility functions
V (:) and W (:). If the tax rate is su¢ ciently close to zero, the quality
of publicly provided services is low and households in a typical district
will choose private services. If the tax rate increases marginally, private
services are still preferred to over publicly provided services. But a small
increase in the foundation tax rate decreases utility, because disposable
income is then lower. If the tax rate increases further, the households
in the district become indi¤erent between public and private services.
Increasing the tax rate above this level induces the households to use
public services and the utility increases until the most preferred founda-
tion tax rate is reached. Any further increase in the tax rate lowers the
households utility7.
Districts with the richest households prefer a zero foundation tax
rate, because they use private schooling and benet more from private
schooling than from any level of public schooling. In turn households in
districts with income below m
f
anticipating that they will utilize public
services prefer a positive foundation tax rate  at which V (:) reaches its
maximum8. Households in districts with income above m
f
anticipating
that they will also utilize public services prefer however a zero foundation
tax rate  , because they are better o¤ funding their schooling with local
taxes than with the central foundation tax9.
To identify the decisive voter we need to know how a preferred foun-
7In this case preferences over tax rates are generally not single peaked and in gen-
eral a global majority voting equilibrium may not exist. See Glomm and Ravikumar
(1998), Epple and Romano (1996a) for details. However some special assumptions
about the way people vote always guarantee the existence of the equilibrium. We
will get back to this problem later.
8Recall, that these households prefer a zero district tax rate.
9As noted earlier, the district with income equal to mf is indi¤erent between local
and central funding.
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dation tax rate changes with income. By skewness of the income distrib-
ution the decisive districts income level will be below the mean resulting
that its preferred district tax rate ti is zero. Using this we apply the im-
plicit function theorem to (4) with equality and obtain
d
dyi
yi<minfmf ;yg = u
00
((1  )yi)ci + u0((1  )yi)
u00((1  )yi)y2i + v00( mf )(mf )2
, (5)
whose sign is that of  fu00((1  )yi)ci + u0((1  )yi)g.
If the sign of (5) is negative10, then a preferred foundation tax rate de-
creases with income among districts that prefer public to private school-
ing. Moreover, all districts that anticipate using public schooling with
income satisfying yi > mf and high-income districts that anticipate using
private services with income yi > y prefer a zero foundation tax rate.
This implies that a preferred foundation tax rate decreases monotoni-
cally with income throughout the entire range of incomes. Hence, using
the single-crossing property rule we obtain that a global political equilib-
rium exists, and that the equilibrium foundation tax rate is the tax rate
preferred by the households in the median income district. The income
of the decisive voter yd satises in this case
F (yd) = 0:5. (6)
If (5) equals zero11, then a preferred foundation tax rate doesnt
depend on income among districts that prefer public to private schooling.
Moreover, like in the previous case, all districts that anticipate using
public schooling with income satisfying yi > mf and high-income districts
that anticipate using private services with income yi > y prefer a zero
foundation tax rate. By skewness of the income distribution a coalition
supporting a zero foundation tax rate consists of less than 50% of the
districts12. It follows that in this case the median income voter is still
decisive and its income satises (6).
If the sign of (5) is positive13, then a preferred foundation tax rate in-
creases with income among districts that prefer public to private school-
ing. Moreover, as before, all districts with income satisfying yi > mf and
high-income districts with income yi > y prefer a zero foundation tax
rate. In this case an "ends against the middle" coalition is formed. Poor
10For the class of the CES utility functions it implies  > 1.
11For the class of the CES utility functions it implies  = 1.
12We assume here that in equilibrium me < y. Since private school users are those
with the highest income levels, this assumption is practically of no consequence. Note
also that me < mf for any f 2 (0; 1].
13For the class of the CES utility functions it implies  < 1.
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districts, which prefer less public spending on education, join forces with
the districts that prefer a zero foundation tax rate. The opposition is
the middle-income districts, which prefer higher spending levels. In this
case in general single-crossing property doesnt hold and a global polit-
ical equilibrium may not exist14. Since the problem of the existence of
a voting equilibrium may hamper the research seriously, some authors
advocate some additional conditions that would guarantee the existence.
For instance Nechyba (1999) uses in his papers the assumption of "my-
opic voting". In our context this assumption means that districts decide
which type of schooling to choose (public or private) before they vote on
the foundation tax rate. Then the voting preferences are single-peaked
and the existence holds in any case. To avoid problems with the exis-
tence of a voting equilibrium we follow this assumption and incorporate
it to our work. Given this assumption the income of the decisive voter
in an equilibrium of this type satises
F (yd) + 1  F (by) = 0:5, (7)
where by = minfm
f
; yg. Note that since f = F (y)  1 and F (m
f
)  1,
the income of the decisive voter yd in this case is not greater than the
median income.
2.3 State System with Private Schools
Under this system districts are required to collect income taxes at a uni-
form rate  from all households in exchange for some per capita revenue
for education, equal for all districts15. Districts are however restricted
to using only these funds for education and cannot supplement it in the
way similar to this under a foundation system. Like in the previous
model, households in all districts have an alternative option of obtain-
ing schooling services from a competitive private-school sector, where
the state nancial support is not available, but still having tax liability.
As before, let f 2 [0; 1] denote the proportion of households choosing
publicly provided services.
2.3.1 Public schools under a state system
Lets assume for a while that all households in a district utilize public
schools and that f is xed. Given that the tax revenues are used to
fund the education and that the state budget is balanced the per-capita
14See Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), Epple and Romano (1996a) for details. The
authors study this problem in similar context to ours where public schooling is ho-
mogenous (no supplementation).
15The presentation of a state system with private schools follows Gradstein, Just-
man and Meier (2005).
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schooling expenditure level is
si= s =
m
f . (8)
It follows that for the representative household in a district i
ci=(1  )yi
si=
m
f
.
The state-system tax rate  is chosen by a majority vote. To nd the
majority vote outcome we have to determine rst a preferred tax rate for
every voter. This preferred tax rate is the solution to the representative
household in a district i0s maximization problem (recall that for public
schools q = s)
max

fu((1  )yi) + v( mf )g
s:t   0 ,
yielding the rst order condition (note that the assumptions about the
utility function guarantee that the solution is unique and interior16)
  u0((1  )yi)yi + v0(m
f
)
m
f
= 0. (9)
The solution tax rate  optimally balances spending on consumption
and spending on education.
For further reference the induced indirect utility function of a house-
hold in a district i that uses public services is
V ( ; f; yi) = u((1  )yi) + v(m
f
).
2.3.2 Private schools under a state system
Under a state system private-school users face the same maximization
problem as under a foundation system. Hence our previous discussion
about private schooling in the case of a foundation system applies here
also.
2.3.3 Equilibrium under a state system with private schools
The crucial di¤erence between a foundation system and a state system
(both with a private-school option) is that under a foundation system
we allow districts to supplement the grant, whereas under a state one
the supplementation of revenues obtained from the state budget for edu-
cation is forbidden. Therefore under a state system no group of districts
16Assumed strict concavity of the utility function guarantees that this preferred
tax rate is unique. This also implies that the rst order condition is necessary and
su¢ cient for optimum. Inada conditions imply interior solution.
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supplements these revenues. Formally, the grant (under a foundation
system) and the revenues from the state budget (under a state system)
have the same meaning. The di¤erence between them is only in the fact
that the grant can be further supplemented using local taxes and the
revenues not. It follows that formally we can treat a state system as
a special case of a foundation system with local tax rates ti equal to
zero for all districts. Hence we can present an equilibrium under a state
system concentrating only on some important aspects that make this
equilibrium slightly di¤erent from the one under a foundation system.
All other issues remain the same.
Assume that all districts in the economy anticipate the same pub-
lic enrolment rate f e. Like under a foundation system, once the state-
system tax rate  has been determined by majority voting (like earlier
 denotes the decisive voter most preferred tax rate), all households in
districts compare their V ( ; f e; yi) andW ( ; yi) and decide which type
of schooling to choose. The representative household in a district i will
choose to send its child to a public school if V ( ; f e; yi) > W ( ; yi).
As before, we have to be sure that in an equilibrium the individual deci-
sions of households are consistent with the aggregate outcomes. That is
the proportion of households for which V ( ; f e; yi) > W ( ; yi) must be
exactly equal to f e. As opting out of public education does not reduce
tax obligations of the representative household in a given district, and
the household is aimed at obtaining a higher quality of education, other
things being equal, households in districts that opt out of public school-
ing will be those with higher incomes. Glomm and Ravikumar (1998)
proved that for a given tax level  2 (0; 1) there exists a threshold income
level y = y( ; f e) such that all households in districts with income below
y send their children to public schools and all households in districts with
income above y send their children to private schools17. This threshold
income is implicitly dened by V ( ; f e; y) = W ( ; y). Hence, using the
threshold income y the consistency condition for an equilibrium given
a state-system tax rate  can be written as f e = F (y( ; f e)) - the an-
ticipated public-school enrolment rate must equal an actual enrolment
rate.
Like under a foundation system all districts in the economy vote on
tax rates and the equilibrium state-system tax rate  is the one chosen
by a majority of voters. The households in the richest districts prefer
17They proved it assuming that a = 1 for public and private schools. However their
result is valid also in our case. The quality parameter a > 1 for private schools shifts
only y downwards, since higher quality in private schools induces more households
(districts) to choose private schooling. This e¤ect was shown by Cohen-Zada and
Justman (2003).
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a zero state-system tax rate, because they benet more from private
schooling than from any level of public schooling. In turn households in
poor districts anticipating that they will utilize public services prefer a
positive state-system tax rate at which it V (:) reaches its maximum. To
identify the decisive voter we need to see how a preferred state-system
tax rate changes with income. Using the implicit function theorem on
(9) we obtain
d
dyi
yi<y = u00((1  )yi)ci + u0((1  )yi)u00((1  )yi)y2i + v00( mf )(mf )2 , (10)
which is formally the same as under a foundation system (eq. (5)). The
sign of (10) is that of  fu00((1  )yi)ci + u0((1  )yi)g.
As before, if the sign of (10) is negative18, then a preferred tax rate de-
creases with income among districts that prefer public to private school-
ing. Since high-income districts that anticipate using private services
prefer a zero state-system tax rate, this implies that a preferred tax rate
decreases monotonically with income throughout the entire range of in-
comes. Hence, using the single-crossing property rule we obtain that a
global political equilibrium exists and that the equilibrium state-system
tax rate is the tax rate preferred by the households in the median income
district. The income of the decisive voter yd satises in this case
F (yd) = 0:5. (11)
If (10) equals zero19, then a preferred foundation tax rate doesnt
depend on income among districts that prefer public to private schooling.
Moreover, all high-income districts that anticipate using private-school
services prefer a zero state-system tax rate. Hence, by skewness of the
income distribution a coalition supporting a zero state-system tax rate
consists of less than 50% of the districts20. It follows that in this case
the median income voter is still decisive and its income satises (11).
If the sign of (10) is positive21, then a preferred tax rate increases with
income among districts that prefer public to private schooling. Like un-
der a foundation case, an "ends against the middle" coalition is formed.
Poor districts, which prefer less public spending on education, join forces
with the rich districts, which would rather send their children to private
schools, and therefore prefer a zero state-system tax rate. The opposition
18For the class of the CES utility functions it implies  > 1.
19For the class of the CES utility functions it implies  = 1.
20We assume here that in equilibrium me < y. Since private school users are those
with the highest income levels, this assumption is practically of no consequence.
21For the class of the CES utility functions it implies  < 1.
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is the middle-income districts, which prefer higher spending levels. As
Epple and Romano (1996a) argue in this case in general single-crossing
property doesnt hold and a global political equilibrium may not exist.
To avoid this problem we will follow the assumption of "myopic voting"
used by Nechyba (1999), which we discussed in the case of a foundation
system equilibrium. Given this assumption the income of the decisive
voter in an equilibrium of this type satises
F (yd) + 1  f = 0:5. (12)
Notice that - like under a foundation system - since f = F (y)  1, the
income of the decisive voter yd in this case is not greater than the median
income.
2.4 Some Analytical Comparisons of the Systems
for the CES Utility Functions
In our computational exercise we will use the class of the CES utility
functions given by (1). We will discuss now some analytical properties
of a voting equilibrium under this class of utility functions. Through-
out this section we will concentrate only on districts that use public
education services.
Note that the rst order condition (9) for a preferred central tax rate
under a state system is identical to the one obtained under a foundation
system in (4) (with equality for ti = 0). Using these rst order conditions
we obtain that for the CES utility functions the formula for a central
tax rate preferred by the representative household in a district i under
both systems can be written as
 =

(fyi
m
) 11  + 
. (13)
It is straightforward to show that a preferred tax rate level is increasing
with f for  < 1 and decreasing with f for  > 1. If  = 1, then changes
in f do not a¤ect a preferred tax rate.
The same formula (13) for both systems doesnt necessarily mean
that under both systems the representative household in a given district
will also prefer the same central tax rate. As can be noticed, a preferred
central tax rate depends on a public enrolment rate. This rate may
be di¤erent in general under both systems, as we will argue later. As
a result, preferred levels of a central tax rate may also di¤er between
both systems. Moreover, under a foundation system some groups of
districts prefer a zero central tax rate, independently of the value given
by (13). This fact may also a¤ect the relation between central-tax-rate
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levels preferred by the representative household in a given district under
both systems.
It follows from our previous discussions and from (13) that if f =
ff = fs
22, then a preferred central tax rate among districts with income
yi <
m
f
is the same under both systems. However, districts with income
yi >
m
f
do not prefer the same central tax rate under both systems23.
Under a foundation system they prefer a zero tax rate, whereas under a
state system a positive tax rate. It is the result of the fact that under
a foundation system districts have an option of funding their education
locally and all districts with income yi > mf prefer this type of funding.
Under a state system it is not possible to fund education locally, and
consequently districts with income yi > mf prefer a positive tax rate.
However, in general we expect that in equilibrium ff > fs. Districts
that supplement the grant under a foundation system will lose such pos-
sibility under a state system. Hence the quality of education in districts
that supplement the grant and whose income is just below yf will likely
fall. This will induce some of the districts to opt out of a public sector
and to use private-school services. As a result, using (13) we obtain
that in an equilibrium the central tax rate preferred by households in a
given district with income yi < mff under a state system will be lower (if
 < 1), the same (if  = 1) or higher (if  > 1) than under a foundation
system. In turn, households in districts with income yi > mff will always
prefer a higher central tax rate under a state system (a positive tax rate)
than under a foundation system (a zero tax rate), independently of the
value of .
These results a¤ect also the equilibrium tax rates. Notice rst that
by eq. (6), (7), (11) and (12) the income level of the decisive voter
under both systems is never greater than the median income level. By
our assumption about the income distribution we have that the median
income me and the mean income m satisfy me < m
ff
for any ff 2 (0; 1].
Hence the decisive voter under both systems has always the income level
lower than m
ff
. Consequently, in the remaining part of this section while
discussing the relationship between the equilibrium tax rates we restrict
our attention only to districts in this income interval.
22We will use index f to denote the values of variables related to a foundation
system and s for the values related to a state system.
23It is very hard to draw similar conclusion for the district with income equal to
m
f . As we noted earlier, under a foundation system this district is indi¤erent between
central and local funding of education. It follows that determination of the relation
between preferred central tax rates under a foundation and a state system is very
di¢ cult. Consequently, in this section we concentrate our discussion on districts with
income di¤erent than mf .
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If a preferred central tax rate is decreasing with income or constant in
income (that is when   1), then under both systems the decisive voter
is the median-income district dened in (6) and (11). Since in all districts
with income yi < mff (in particular in the median-income district) under
a state system the preferred central tax rate is the same (if  = 1)
or higher (if  > 1) than under a foundation system, the equilibrium
central tax rate under a state system will also be respectively the same
or higher than under a foundation system. Notice also that when   1
it is not possible that in equilibrium ff = fs. If a given district opts
out of a public sector as a consequence of the reform, then the only way
to make it go back to this sector under a state system is to raise the
quality level of public education. In our model this can be achieved only
by increasing the per-capita spending in the public education, given by
(8) (recall that for all public schools the relationship between quality of
schooling q and the per-capita spending in education s is q = s). Since
we would like to have under a state system the same public enrolment
rate as under a foundation system (f = ff = fs), raising this per-capita
education spending requires to increase appropriately the equilibrium
state-system tax rate compared to the equilibrium foundation tax rate.
However, using (13) (with the xed value of f = ff = fs) and the fact
that under a foundation system and under a state system the decisive
voter has the same level of income (the median income), we obtain that
under both systems the equilibrium central tax rate necessarily has to
be the same. It follows that the desired increase in the equilibrium state-
system tax rate and - consequently - the equality of the public enrolment
rates is in this case not possible.
If a preferred central tax rate is increasing with income and an "ends
against the middle" coalitions are formed (that is when  < 1), then the
relationship between the equilibrium tax rates is now not so obvious.
Now the decisive voter under both systems has in general di¤erent in-
come, dened in (7) and (12). Depending upon the equilibrium levels of
public enrolment rates ff and fs, which determine the relation between
values of by = minfm
ff
; yfg and ys, the size of a coalition supporting a
zero central tax rate under a state system may be smaller, the same or
larger than under a foundation system. If the equilibrium values of ff
and fs are such that by < ys, then the size of a coalition supporting a
zero central tax rate under a foundation system is larger than the size of
a similar coalition under a state system. It follows that in this case the
decisive voter under a state system will have higher income than under
a foundation system. Now two opposite factors determine the relation
between the equilibrium central tax rates under both systems. On the
one hand, higher income of the decisive voter under a state system in-
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creases its preferred central tax rate compared to the central tax rate
preferred by the decisive voter under a foundation system. On the other
hand, using previous arguments we have that for  < 1 in all districts
with income yi < mff (in particular in the decisive district, whose income
belongs to this interval) a preferred central tax rate under a state system
is in general lower than under a foundation system (it may be the same
if in equilibrium ff = fs, which is a very unlikely outcome). As a result,
the equilibrium central tax rate under a state system may be lower, the
same or higher than under a foundation system. The outcome in a given
case depends on the relationship between the two opposite factors.
However, it may happen that the equilibrium values of ff and fs are
such that by  ys. Then the size of a coalition supporting a zero central
tax rate under a foundation system is the same or smaller than the size
of a similar coalition under a state system. As a result, the decisive
voter under a state system will have the same or lower income than
under a foundation system. The same or lower income of the decisive
voter under a state system respectively keeps constant or decreases its
preferred central tax rate compared to the central tax rate preferred by
the decisive voter under a foundation system. Moreover, we have here
that for  < 1 in all districts with income yi < mff (in particular in
the decisive district) a preferred central tax rate under a state system
is lower than under a foundation system (as we will show in a while
it cannot be the same since here always ff > fs). In total these two
e¤ects result in the equilibrium state-system tax rate lower than the
foundation tax rate. Notice that in this case it is not possible that
in equilibrium ff = fs. It might happen here only if ys = yf  mff
were satised (recall that ff = F (yf ) and fs = F (ys)). Using similar
arguments as before, in order to have in equilibrium under a state system
the same public enrolment rate as under a foundation system we need
to raise appropriately the equilibrium state-system tax rate compared
to the equilibrium foundation tax rate. However, using (13) (with the
xed value of f = ff = fs) and the fact that under a foundation system
and under a state system the decisive voter has the same level of income
(if ys = yf  mff , then the size of a coalition supporting a zero central
tax rate is the same under both systems, determined by values of ys and
yf), we obtain that under both systems the equilibrium central tax rate
necessarily has to be the same. It follows that the desired increase in
the equilibrium state-system tax rate and - consequently - the equality
of the public enrolment rates is in this case not possible.
The change in the equilibrium central tax rate is one of the factors
that a¤ect changes in total education expenditure. This factor leads to
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the increase or decrease in the expenditure level under a state system
relative to that one under a foundation system, depending on whether
the equilibrium state tax rate is respectively higher or lower than the
foundation tax rate. In particular the expenditure may remain constant
if the equilibrium tax rates are the same. However, there is another
factor that decreases education spending under a state system: under
a state system, districts cannot supplement the revenues obtained from
the state for education. Total education spending is also a¤ected by
changes in a private enrolment rate. As we showed before, under a state
system this enrolment rate likely increases. Hence districts that switch
to use private-school services decide about their new level of education
spending in order to adjust to the new environment.
3 Quantitative Results
In this section we report the results of quantitative comparison of a
foundation and a state system when we allow for the presence of private
schooling. A foundation system will be treated as the benchmark system
for our comparisons, since it is considered to be the best approximation
of the existing "average" system in the USA. Both education nance
systems a¤ect total schooling expenditure and welfare. Our objective is
to obtain some sense for how large di¤erences might be if we introduce
private schools to the model.
3.1 Functional Forms and Parameter Values
We begin by specifying functional forms and assigning parameter values.
Our models structure is very parsimonious - we need to choose only
the distribution of income and dene in a detailed way preferences over
consumption and quality of education.
A possible choice for the income distribution is to use households
income distribution for a typical year. But if we interpret the model as
referring to the entire schooling period of a child, then presumably it is
the distribution of income over a longer time span (like life-time income)
that is more relevant. However, Fernández and Rogerson (2003), who
do comparison similar to ours, report that the choice between these two
types of income distribution is not important quantitatively. Following
their remark we concentrate in our calibration exercise on annual income
distribution. Specically, we use data on the United States income distri-
bution in 1989. In our computational analysis we utilize approximation
to the income distribution by the log-normal distribution of the form
ln(y)  N(; )24, where  is the expected value and  is the standard
24If ln(y)  N(; ), then the mean m of y is m = E(y) = e(+ 
2
2 ), and the median
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deviation of ln(y). As Epple and Romano (1996a) report, in the United
States in 1989 mean and median household income were 36,250 $ and
28,906 $, respectively. These pieces of data imply that  = 3:36 and
 = 0:68 (for income measured in thousands).
To describe preferences over consumption and quality of education
we use the family of the CES utility functions dened in (1). This choice
of a functional form is dictated by the empirical evidence that over the
long run educational expenditures and personal income grow at (approx-
imately) the same rate. Over the last thirty years public spending on
primary and secondary education as a fraction of personal income has
remained roughly constant, despite roughly a doubling of real personal
income. This nding holds after considering other potential factors (like
observed changes in the fertility rate or standard deviation of earnings)
that could inuence the education spending. In our model, for both edu-
cation nance systems we consider, the requirement that a proportional
shift in the income distribution (holding xed the education nance sys-
tem) keeps constant the share of income spent on education (implying
income elasticity of demand equal to one) requires that preferences be
homothetic. Given this the natural class of utility functions to consider
is that of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) (and its monotone
transformations).
Given this specication, there are two parameters to determine, 
- the elasticity of substitution between consumption and schooling and
. However, quality q depends on the parameter a, which has to be
specied for private schools (for public schools it is equal to one). Hence
full specication of the utility function for our problem requires to nd
values of three parameters.
How to determine the value of  is not completely obvious. A natural
restriction on values of parameter  seems to be  < 1. Under this
restriction a preferred tax rate is increasing with income. Fernández
and Rogerson (2003) argue that such restriction in richer models with
endogenous stratication of income types into communities is required
to ensure that richer communities have higher quality education. The
authors also study the empirical literature and nd strong support for
this restriction on values of parameter . They also report that vast
majority of empirical results related to a foundation system suggests
 between 0.33 and 1. However, to start the computational exercise
we need to restrict further values of . Epple and Romano (1996a)
obtained that  = 0:65 does the best job in their model of education
with private schools. We incorporate their nding in our model but also
me of y is me = e. Given the mean and the median of y, these can be solved for 
and .
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do some sensitivity analysis of our results to changes of this parameter,
examining selected values of  between 0.33 and 1.
Parameters  and a are chosen simultaneously. We choose  to gen-
erate in an equilibrium the average expenditure per student in public
schools under a foundation system equal to 2,111 $, which is the ob-
served level of per-household public education expenditure in the USA
in 1988 (Epple and Romano (1996a))25. Since we expected that the
quality parameter a would strongly inuence the equilibrium public en-
rolment rate, our goal was to nd such value of a that would guarantee
the public-school enrolment level equal to 88%, reported by the em-
pirical data for the USA (Epple and Romano (1996a)). There is little
literature which could help us to nd exact value of a. Cohen-Zada and
Justman (2003) in their calibration for the case of a state system with
private schools received a value of a for private schools of the order of
1.5. We tried to incorporate this value of a for private schools in our
computational exercise, but unfortunately it turned out that a = 1:5 is
too small to guarantee the desired public-school enrolment rate of 88%.
However, the process of calibration showed that  had very little impact
on the equilibrium public enrolment rate but substantial on the equi-
librium per-student public expenditure level and conversely, a strongly
inuenced the equilibrium public enrolment rate but very little the equi-
librium per-student public expenditure level. Using this fact we found
for di¤erent values of  corresponding values of  and a, which guar-
anteed in an equilibrium the desired levels of a public-school enrolment
rate and per-student expenditure.
3.2 General Calibration Results
Table 1 presents the results of our parameter calibration with corre-
sponding values of the equilibrium central tax rates and the equilibrium
public-school enrolment rates.
As we expected, when we go from a foundation system to a state
system of education nancing, the equilibrium public-school enrolment
rate decreases. This is indicated by two last columns of Table 1. As can
also be seen, in general the equilibrium central tax rate is higher under a
state system than under a foundation system. These results correspond
to the ambiguous case when the decisive voter under a state system
has higher income than under a foundation system (by < ys), which we
discussed in Section 2.4. In our exercise we have that the positive e¤ect
(on a preferred central tax rate) of shifting the decisive voter income
25The observed per-student public expenditure level was 4,222 $, but there were
0.5 students per household. This gives the per-household public expenditure level
equal to 2,111 $.
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  a  f  s f f f s
0.40 0.0012861 1.5600 0.0387 0.0338 0.8800 0.7000
0.50 0.0045490 1.6165 0.0409 0.0419 0.8800 0.7805
0.60 0.0104510 1.6770 0.0429 0.0459 0.8800 0.8181
0.65 0.0143362 1.7083 0.0439 0.0471 0.8800 0.8302
0.70 0.0187540 1.7410 0.0448 0.0480 0.8800 0.8393
0.80 0.0288330 1.8085 0.0465 0.0490 0.8800 0.8517
0.90 0.0399850 1.8789 0.0479 0.0493 0.8800 0.8586
0.99 0.0504330 1.9441 0.0490 0.0491 0.8800 0.8615
Table 1: Parameter calibration results
upwards is stronger than the negative e¤ect of decrease in the public
enrolment rate. As a result, we have that the equilibrium central tax rate
is higher under a state system than under a foundation system. However,
for  = 0:4 this is not the case26. Here, the equilibrium central tax rate is
lower under a state system than under a foundation system. This result
corresponds to the case when the income of the decisive voter under a
state system is below the income of the decisive voter under a foundation
system (by > ys). We have here that the negative e¤ect (on a preferred
central tax rate) of shifting the decisive voter income downwards adds
up to the negative e¤ect of decrease in the public enrolment rate. As
a result, we observe a drop in the equilibrium central tax rate. We
discussed this likely e¤ect in Section 2.4.
Note also that as  approaches one, we observe that the equilibrium
central tax rates under both systems converge to each other. This is
consistent with our previous results. Using eq. (13) we obtain that for 
equal to one a preferred central tax rate is the same under both systems
and independent of a public enrolment rate. Moreover, for this value of
 under both systems the median income district is decisive. As a result,
the equilibrium tax rates will be the same. Note also that similarly - as
 approaches one - the equilibrium public enrolment rates converge to
each other. However, we do not expect them to be equal in the limit,
when  equals one. As we argued in Section 2.4, the equilibrium public
enrolment rates cannot be equal for this value of .
3.3 Education Spending Analysis
In this section we report our results concerning the education expen-
ditures under both nance systems. Tables 2-5 present the predicted
expenditure e¤ects of the change from a foundation system to a state
26Of course by continuity this applies also to other values in the close neighbour-
hood of  = 0:4.
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
Qs Qf
Qf
QPUBs  QPUBf
QPUBf
QPRIVs  QPRIVf
QPRIVf
QPUBf  QPUBg
QPUBf
s g
g
0.40 -0.0760 -0.3400 0.8254 0.2458 0.1002
0.50 -0.0303 -0.1820 0.4924 0.2027 0.1568
0.60 -0.0103 -0.1048 0.3186 0.1622 0.1494
0.65 -0.0050 -0.0809 0.2603 0.1434 0.1374
0.70 -0.0019 -0.0636 0.2144 0.1254 0.1226
0.80 -0.0007 -0.0438 0.1516 0.0928 0.0890
0.90 -0.0043 -0.0383 0.1166 0.0650 0.0543
0.99 -0.0102 -0.0418 0.1024 0.0445 0.0244
Table 2: Comparison of total expenditures on education under both
systems
 CV f CV s
Qf
m
Qs
m
0.40 0.4839 0.4863 0.0663 0.0612
0.50 0.4653 0.4315 0.0661 0.0641
0.60 0.4469 0.4070 0.0660 0.0653
0.65 0.4381 0.3997 0.0659 0.0656
0.70 0.4295 0.3945 0.0659 0.0657
0.80 0.4138 0.3890 0.0658 0.0657
0.90 0.4007 0.3883 0.0657 0.0654
0.99 0.3915 0.3906 0.0656 0.0649
Table 3: Total expenditures on education under both systems - the co-
e¢ cient of variation and the fraction of total income spent on education
system.
Table 2 shows the impact of nance system change on a total educa-
tion expenditure level. We utilize here the following notation: Q denotes
total education expenditure; superscripts PUB and PRIV denote ex-
penditures in a public and private sector, respectively; QPUBg denotes
total central funds spent on foundation grants under a foundation sys-
tem; s denotes per-student expenditure in a public sector under a state
system; g denotes a foundation grant level under a foundation system.
The second column of this table gives information about the change of
total resources spent on education. The third and the fourth columns
provide information about the change of total resources spent on educa-
tion within sectors - public and private, respectively. The penultimate
column shows the fraction of total expenditures within a public sector
under a foundation system that are accounted for by spending above a
grant level g. The last column shows the fraction of a foundation system
grant level g by which it is exceeded by per-student spending in a public
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sector under a state system.
As can be seen, the model predicts that a shift from a foundation to
a state system will result in a drop in total education spending. This
drop is accompanied by a substantial fall in resources spent on public
education. However, total spending in a private sector increases with the
change of a system. A clear pattern emerges as  increases: the e¤ect of
the reform on total expenditures, also within sectors, becomes smaller.
These results conrm ndings of Fernández and Rogerson (1999). The
authors studied e¤ects of the same nance reform on total expendi-
ture in a public education sector but without considering the existence
of private schools. Similarly to their ndings our model predicts that
switching from a foundation system to a state one causes a fall in the
total expenditures for education in a public sector. However, detailed
comparison of theirs and our ndings sheds new light on the e¤ects of
the reform. First, for similar range of parameter  Fernández and Roger-
son (1999) obtained that total public expenditures decreased by between
8% and 13%. Our model predicts much greater range of this drop by
between 4.18% and 34%. This di¤erence is caused by the private-school
alternative. As our model predicts, switching of a nance system induces
many households to start to use private education as the response to cen-
tralization of a nance system and equalization of per-student spending
in a public sector. These changes in private-school enrolment addition-
ally a¤ect total funds spent on public schools in the economy. Second,
a relatively large drop in total expenditures in a public sector doesnt
necessarily mean a large fall in total resources spent on education in the
whole economy. As can be seen in Table 2 these are a¤ected very little
by the change of a nance system compared to a public sector, with a
drop ranging between 1.02% and 7.6%, depending upon the exact value
of . This smaller drop is again due to the existence of private schools.
In consequence of the reform substantial amount of total resources is
just shifted from a public sector to a private one. A private-school sec-
tor benets from the system change in terms of total expenditure on
education. This expenditure increases within the range between 10.24%
and 82.54%, depending upon the exact value of .
Table 3 reports for both systems a value of the coe¢ cient of vari-
ation of education spending across students and the fraction of total
income devoted to education, denoted by CV and Q
m
, respectively. For
any value of , the fraction of total income spent on education remains
roughly constant: between 6.56% and 6.63% under a foundation system,
and between 6.12% and 6.49% under a state system. The coe¢ cient of
variation can be interpreted as a measure of inequality of educational
resources across the income distribution. The lower it is, the more equi-
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
AQPUBs  AQPUBf
AQPUBf
AQPRIVs  AQPRIVf
AQPRIVf
0.40 -0.1702 -0.2699
0.50 -0.0777 -0.1843
0.60 -0.0370 -0.1305
0.65 -0.0256 -0.1103
0.70 -0.0181 -0.0934
0.80 -0.0121 -0.0682
0.90 -0.0143 -0.0525
0.99 -0.0212 -0.0449
Table 4: Comparison of per-student expenditures on education under
both systems
table is the nance system. Some authors provide results showing that
the dispersion of school expenditures falls with centralization (Fernández
and Rogerson (2003)). They also show that a pure state system without
a private-school option has the value of the coe¢ cient of variation equal
to zero. Our results conrm the former nding, but not the latter one.
In our model with private schools a state system is more equitable than
a foundation system, but the di¤erence in inequality measured by the
coe¢ cient of variation is very small. What we observe is only a small fall
in the coe¢ cient of variation under a state system compared to a foun-
dation system. Our results also show that if we introduce private schools
to a pure state system, then the coe¢ cient of variation can no longer be
equal to zero. This great di¤erence between a pure state system and our
case comes from the fact that at the top of the income distribution there
is more households opting out to private schools, which raises inequality.
Since the number of public and private-sector users changes with the
change of a nance system, the natural question to ask is how it a¤ects
per-student expenditures on education. Table 4 presents our ndings
about per-student education expenditures in a public and private sector
for di¤erent values of . In the table AQ denotes per-student education
spending. As can be seen, the model predicts a drop in per-student
education spending in both public and private sector. This fall is even
greater in private schools. The drop in a public sector is caused by the
fact that districts no longer can supplement their education spending.
The supplementation under a foundation system accounts for between
4.45% and 24.58% of total education spending in a public sector (as
shown in Table 2). Under a state system these additional sources of
funds are not available and increased central per-student revenues (com-
pared to a foundation grant level, as shown in the last column of Table
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Income percentile range AQf AQs
0.00-0.02 1.8084 2.0569
0.02-0.10 1.8084 2.0569
0.10-0.20 1.8084 2.0569
0.20-0.30 1.8084 2.0569
0.30-0.40 1.8084 2.0569
0.40-0.50 1.8084 2.0569
0.50-0.60 1.9071 2.0569
0.60-0.70 2.2459 2.0569
0.70-0.80 2.7094 2.0569
0.80-0.90 3.3016 2.6478
0.90-0.98 4.0576 4.0440
0.98-1.00 7.2335 7.2093
CV 0.4381 0.3997
Table 5: Distributions of per-student education spending under both
systems for  = 0:65
2) are not able to compensate this loss. The drop in spending per stu-
dent in private schools has two main sources. The rst one is that under
a state system the central tax rate (as presented in Table 1) is higher
than under a foundation one (except for  = 0:4, when it is lower). This
decreases disposable income of households under a state system and - in
consequence - their education spending. The second one is that under a
state system the private-school enrolment rate (as suggested by data in
Table 1) is higher than under a foundation one. Under a state system
new districts start to use private-school services. These new districts
entering a private sector are populated by households with lower income
levels than districts that have already used private schools. The new
private-school users necessarily spend on education less than richer dis-
tricts, which negatively a¤ects per-student spending in a private-school
sector.
Table 5 presents an example of distributions of per-student education
spending under both systems for  = 0:65. It allows us to see which
households lose and which benet from the nance system change in
terms of per-student education spending. Clearly, approximately 60%
of all households (the group of the poorest households) benet from
the change into the state system. Per-student expenditure increases for
them. However, households above the 60th income percentile lose in
consequence of this change. Note also that the reform results in a more
equitable distribution of per-student education spending under a state
system than under a foundation system, as indicated by corresponding
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values of the coe¢ cient of variation.
3.4 Welfare Analysis
In this section we examine the welfare implications of our two education
nance systems. To compare the overall welfare we compute for each
system the expected utility that a household would obtain, if under that
system its income were a random draw from the income distribution.
Specically, for a foundation system and for a state system we compute
the expected utilities denoted EUf and EUs, respectively. Although
comparisons of these two welfare indices allow us to conclude whether
welfare has increased or not, it does not provide any information as
to how signicant the change in welfare is. Hence, we are interested
in using a measure of welfare change that is not a¤ected by monotone
transformations of a utility function. Using a foundation system as the
benchmark for our utility comparisons, we compute the fraction  by
which the entire income distribution would have to be changed under
a foundation system so that a foundation system and a state system
provide the same aggregate welfare (Fernández and Rogerson (1997)).
For the class of CES utility functions that we use, it means to nd the
value  such that
(1 + )1 
1
EUf = EUs.
This expression follows from the fact that for this class of utility functions
indirect utility functions are homogenous of degree (1  1

) in income.
Table 6 presents the results of our welfare comparisons for di¤erent
values of parameter . An immediate result is that in the presence
of the private-school alternative a state system is welfare superior to
a foundation system (note that a positive values of  indicates that
households obtain higher expected utility under a state system than
under a foundation system). For  = 0:65 all households in the economy
would have to have income higher by 0.14% under a foundation system
to obtain the same expected utility as under a state system. This welfare
di¤erence may seem to be not very big. However, we have to keep in
mind that total education expenditures comprise only a small fraction
of the total income (under a foundation system it is between 6.56% and
6.63%) and while interpreting this welfare di¤erence we should scale it
in proportion to the size of the education sector.
The advantage of a state alternative decreases when values of  in-
crease, but even for  close to one welfare is higher under a state system
than under a foundation one. These gains reect the fact that resources
are being reallocated from wealthier to less wealthy individuals, or equiv-
alently - that the variance of the consumption and schooling expendi-
tures distributions are being diminished, as indicated by values of the
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 
0.40 0.0066
0.50 0.0033
0.60 0.0018
0.65 0.0014
0.70 0.0011
0.80 0.0007
0.90 0.0006
0.99 0.0007
Table 6: Welfare comparison of the education nance systems
coe¢ cient of variation in Table 3.
These results are more striking, when we compare them with ones ob-
tained by other authors. Fernández and Rogerson (2003) in very similar
static comparison, but not allowing for the presence of private schools,
obtained a converse result that a foundation system was welfare supe-
rior to a state system. Our result shows that a private-school option
has great importance in terms of total welfare. It strongly a¤ects total
welfare induced by a nance system. The observed shift upwards of a
welfare level can be explained by the combined e¤ect of quality gains
in private schools, increased private-school enrolment under a state sys-
tem and also higher per-student expenditure in public schools under a
state system in a group of the poorest districts. Under a state system a
larger group of households benets from increased schooling quality in a
private sector. Also a group of the poorest public-sector users benets
from increased per-student expenditure. These e¤ects in total positively
a¤ect the expected utility under a state system.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we used a political economy approach to analyse the out-
comes generated by a foundation system and a state system of education
nance in the presence of private schools. In addition to analytically
characterizing both systems we carried out a calibration exercise to as-
sess quantitative signicance of the di¤erences between these systems.
We found that compared to pure systems without private schools the
private alternative introduces substantial distortion in welfare and edu-
cation spending distributions. In particular, we showed that considering
private schools in the model reverses the present-in-the-literature rank-
ing in which a foundation system is welfare superior to a state system.
In the light of our ndings this ranking turns out to be true only if we do
not allow in the model for the existence of private schools. The private-
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school alternative also inuences the equity under both nance systems,
especially strongly in the case of a state system. A pure state system is
considered to be the most equitable among di¤erent education nance
systems. Our results show, however, that introducing private schools to
the model results in equity under a state system only a little higher than
under a foundation system. Moreover, this equity, as measured by the
coe¢ cient of variation, is far from perfect equity attributed to a pure
state system. Our ndings conrm the result, present in the literature,
that a shift from a foundation to a state system causes a fall in total
resources spent on public education. They also reveal that this change
of a nance system may result in decreasing per-student spending in
both public and private sector. This happens, though private schools
benet from higher total spending under a state system than under a
foundation one.
Our model was purposefully simple in order to explore the relations
between total resources to education, welfare and also equity. This ap-
proach allowed us to obtain analytical and quantitative results regard-
ing both nance systems and compare them. We close with some cau-
tions about interpreting our results. First, due to calibration issues, in
our quantitative exercise we used data for 1989, which are now a little
outdated. So probably the results obtained for current data would be
slightly di¤erent in details. Second, our analysis is static and doesnt
consider any dynamic long-term implications of the change of an edu-
cation nance system on the income distribution, which could possibly
change our ndings.
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